(My Response)
A Technological Context for the Boycott
I think you might want to put the jitneys into a broader
context of transportation policy. One could probably make a case
for local governments functioning as Luddites during the
Civil Rights movement, that is, trying to repress the implications
of the automobile.
According to Harvard Sitkoff, (_The Struggle for Black
Equality, 1954-1980_, 1981), when the bus strike began, the
Montgomery Improvement Association leadership immediately
got the black taxicab companies to turn their taxicabs into ad-hoc
jitneys, waiving the city-mandated minimum fare. The mayor
responded by threatening sanctions for breaking the minimum fare,
and the MIA leadership responded by organizing a car pool
with about 150 automobiles and about 100 stations. I haven't
tracked down a more detailed source, but the organization seems to
look a lot like the later "dial-a-ride" schemes, centrally
organized jitneys run by transit authorities. The mayor
responded by legally harassing the drivers. This is where
your applicants for a jitney license come in. There was a
whole legal construct designed to create two discrete categories,
viz. private automobiles and cabs for the classes, and buses for
the masses, excluding jitneys in the middle.
When the dust had ultimately settled, fifty years later, the
Montgomery bus system was in an extremely marginal
condition, used on a daily basis by about one percent of the
population, at effective speeds slower than a bicycle. Mass
transit only really works well when you have skyscrapers, or
perhaps in a college town. In a large city, transit tends to
be naturally segregated in the sense that there are two or three
tiers of transit, with different trade-offs of speed and local
stops. A more or less similar argument could probably be made for
the Greyhound stations and the rise of the Interstate
Highway system. The whole "back of the bus" mentality may
have reflected the fact that there increasingly wasn't a
front of the bus anymore.
There is considerable evidence that buses are not able to
compete with jitneys as a general thing, at least in
low-density areas, meaning practically anywhere in the South.
However, jitneys seem to have been a kind of "moving
window" in the sense that they were rapidly succeeded by private
automobile ownership. The first burst of "jitneyism" in the North
and West, circa 1915, coincided with the peak boom year of the
automobile industry. Jitneyism was promptly repressed by a mass of
local ordinances sponsored by street car companies.
After the automobile industry's 1921 overproduction
downturn, the used automobile market took off. Six years of
technological progress represented the difference between a
machine which was economic if used communally and a machine
which was economic if used individually. Something
roughly similar seems to have happened in the post office, circa
1915-16, involving disputes between the Wilson Administration's
Texan Postmaster-General, Albert Burleson, and rural
postal carriers who wanted to use motorcycles to deliver the mail.
The carriers wanted rural mail-delivery to be a part-time
occupation of mature men with other resources, eg. farmers,
but Burleson wanted carriers to be poorly paid young
full-timers. The vehicle of Ludditism was paradoxically
technological, to demand an impractical standard of mechanical
perfection in motorized transport, forcing the vast majority
of carriers to use horses. By 1925 or so, the well-equipped rural
carrier was driving a bargain-basement Model T Ford, furnished
with a caterpillar-tread conversion kit (like a snowmobile, on a
larger scale), capable of going more or less anywhere the later
four-wheel-drive vehicles would be able to go.
In the 1950's, the South was catching up with the North in terms
of mechanization. The advent of the cotton harvester is a fairly
good benchmark. It was the sort of machine which could have
happened forty years earlier, except for the South's general
lack of mechanical competence. One would have to track
down statistics on automobile ownership in Alabama and
Mississippi, but one suspects that on the eve of the
Montgomery Bus Boycott, the Deep South had reached
approximately the point of departure which the rest of
the country had reached in 1915. Of course there is a whole
mass of factual information which needs to be collected: who rode
Montgomery city buses and why, who rode Greyhound buses and why,
who ate in Greyhound station restaurants, and were they the
same people who rode the bus?
A city bus can be viewed as a similar exercise in paradoxical
Ludditism. It is not terribly practical, save on the
highest-density routes. However, given its long wheelbase, the bus
tends to require special skills to drive, similar to a
semi-trailer. That is, it tends to make driving into a
"mystery," available only to a special elite (I used to live in
Cincinnati, the City of the Seven Hills. To watch a Cincinnati bus
driver taking a bus down a hill of three hundred vertical feet,
with hairpin turns and a grade of ten percent, is to witness
artistry of the highest order). A jitney driver, driving a much
smaller vehicle, would not have to exhibit that order of
skill. Driving a bus was a kind of public performance of
technological priesthood.
If you look at government white papers on transportation from the
last traffic-energy-environment crisis, back in the 1960's and
1970's, you find that the more enlightened transportation planners
were somewhat interested in jitneys. However, they tended to
"assimilate" the jitney, by insisting that it be plugged
into a centralized radio-controlled dispatching system with a
computer-- and this at a time when computers were still big
expensive machines. In effect, the transport planner looked at the
toys the Air Force had, and said that he wanted those,
too. However, the main thread of the planners' desire was
towards an automatic, driverless vehicle running on an automatic
road, automatically switched and routed. Since using this system
would not be dependent on the ability to drive, nor would it have
the high direct labor costs of taxicabs, the whole notion of
public transportation would be effectively abolished, in
approximately the same sense that the party-line
telephone and the manual switchboard were being
abolished.
The foregoing is a very brief and conjectural sketch.
Now, one can detect similar or analogous responses to other
technologies, for example, the response of authoritarian
governments to internet cafes. It is hard to say how far one can
expand the analogy.
http://urbanhabitat.org/highwayrobbery
http://www.montgomerytransit.com/
http://www.firsttransit.com/FirsttransitView.php?id=115
Editorial, Change transportation mindset, Montgomery Advertiser,
circa June 22, 2007
http://www.montgomeryadvertiser.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20070622/OPINION01/706210349/1006/rss06
James H. Bruns, Motorized Mail, 1997 (Krause Publications,
Iola, WI)
Tomorrow's Transportation: New Systems for the Urban
Future, U. S. Department of Housing
and Urban Development, Office of
Metropolitan Development, Urban Transportation
Administration, Washington D.C., 1968 (Library of
Congress catalog number 68-61300)
Metrotran-2000: A Study of Future
Concepts in Metropolitan
Transportation for the
Year 2000, Cornell Aeronautical
Laboratories, Inc., by: Robert A. Wolf, Transportation
Research Department, CAL No. 150, October 1967
(My Response:)
(06/02/2010 02:36 PM)
Economic Contexts for Public Accommodation.
A generic problem of the Civil Rights "narrative" is that it does
not have a very good economic and technological context. I have
commented about this in respect of the Montgomery Bus Boycott.
[Above]
but this also applies to the Sit-Ins, and by extension, to the
Civil Rights law as it applies to public accommodations.
The Sit-Ins did not typically involve small businesses. They
tended to involve branches of national chains. The defining
first sit-in in Greensboro was in a Woolworth's, a chain dime
store. Perhaps Ralph Luker could comment on this point
in somewhat more detail, but the intent of the
students involved in sit-ins was in some considerable part to
force large Northern corporations to cease treating accommodation
with "Jim Crow" as a mere local difference. That was
of course what happened, fairly quickly. The main office in
Chicago or New York decreed integration, and that was
the end of the matter. If the local manager
didn't like it, he was welcome to find another job,
and the same applied with even more force to the
people behind the soda counter. The
local manager was not master in his own house, or
anything like that. He was a bureaucrat under orders. Over
the last fifty years, grocery stores, of course, went from
being small businesses on the street corner to being
giant store chains, and merged into other kinds
of stores, to the point that it is increasingly difficult to
tell a grocery store from a discount/department store.
For what it is worth, the chains seem to have been
disproportionately Northern. The North produced men
like Ray Kroc of McDonald's (a Chicagoan of Bohemian
descent), who could apply logistics and industrial engineering
methods to run small stores with such efficiency that
they could support a national command structure, and
absentee stockholders, and still compete with independent
stores.What makes McDonald's work is the fact of
standardization, meaning that you can go into a McDonald's
in a place you have never been, and get the kind of
food you expect to get, not as good as it might be, to be sure,
but not as bad as it might be, either. Now, I grant
you that Sam Walton of Wal-Mart was a southerner, but he
only arrived very late in the game, after about a hundred
years of experimentation.One characteristic of men like Kroc and
Walton was that they tended to filter out social
interactions, and concentrate on the business at hand,
to construct it in such a way as not to contain social
interactions. That is, they would ask whether it was possible to
sell X via vending machines, or something in that direction,
at a much lower price. Quite often it was. The further trend was
to the internet. The gloriously unsuccessful WebVan internet
grocer was run by Louis Borders, who had started out
running a college bookstore in Ann Arbor, Michigan.
I am tolerably sure that Woolworth's and its rival chains would
have run their soda fountains as "loss-leaders," with a view
to attracting more expensive purchases. There is a genre of
"starving graduate student" stories-- for example, the actor
William Shatner (Captain Kirk of Star Trek) is said to have
lived largely on Kresge's fruit salad when he was doing
"repertory theater" as a young man in the 1950's. (Stephen
Whitfield and Gene Roddenberry, _The Making of Star Trek_,
1968, p. 219). Woolworth's was able to function as a whole because
it had a more efficient purchasing organization in Brooklyn, that
great district of small factories, than an independent
store somewhere in the South could possibly have. For
practical purposes, prior to desegregation, Woolworth's had
two price schedules-- one for Whites and one for Blacks.
Obviously, that did rise to the level of blatant economic
discrimination.
Running a bar inherently involves dealing with patrons who have
had too much. Bars get sued when someone exits,
reeling drunk, and then causes an automobile accident. This is, I
think, where [Lawrence] Brooks Hughes' "tough guy" approach
is relevant. The corporatist approach to selling alcohol, as
represented by, say, Seven-Eleven, is that they sell beer by the
six-pack (or nowadays by the "suitcase-pack"), but
that they don't pretend to provide a place to drink it, or
to supervise the drinking. Their customers are supposed to
drink at home, and if they become drunk in a public place
instead, say the local park, that becomes a nuisance for the
police to deal with. The corporation doesn't try to run a
workingman's bar, in short.
Barbershops are also different from stores, of course. I am
reminded of Robert Morley's line, as Louis XI, in
the film _Quentin Durward_ (1955): [going by memory]
"If there is one man a king must
trust, it is his barber-- who daily
holds a knife at his throat!" More mundanely, a good
barbershop is a kind of clubhouse. Any hundred or so men, under
the standards of trim prevailing in 1960, could have clubbed
together and supported a barbershop in their own neighborhood. I
recall sitting in a barbershop in a Philadelphia
neighborhood, circa 1990, waiting the better part of an hour
for my haircut, and in the meantime scratching the ears of a
large and shaggy mutt named Lana (at a guess, a German
Shepherd-Birddog-cross), keeping her amused while her
person, a local editor, was reading through my tearsheet file (*).
The Italian barber had made the introduction,
in his capacity as compere. The same kind of thing
applies for a bar.
Here is a blog thread about a case involving what
one might call the boundaries of public
accommodation. It involves an apartment-sharing bureau
(Roommates) and a classified-advertisements-listing service
(Craigslist), which had posted apartment-sharing ads. The
law in question is not the Civil Rights Act per se, but the
closely related Fair Housing Act (Title VIII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1968).
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20080403/151351742.shtml
and see my analysis:
http://www.techdirt.com/article.php?sid=20080403/151351742#c579
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HUD site: Fair Housing Laws and Presidential Executive
Orders
http://www.hud.gov/offices/fheo/FHLaws/index.cfm
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Quentin Durward (1955):
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0048528/
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(*) Tearsheet file-- a custom prevailing among print journalists,
a set of copies of published work, eg. things in newspapers
and magazines. In recent years, that meant
photocopies, but the name survives from a time when
the cheapest way to assemble a file was to purchase
extra copies and tear out the pages one wanted. Hence
tearsheet. The functional equivalent of a C.V.
-------------------------------------------------------------
My comments in a comment thread, relating to:
formerly:
http://hnn.us/articles/7919.html
And the comment thread:
https://web.archive.org/web/20041029110117/http://hnn.us/readcomment.php?id=44802#44802
Well, at the end of the day, the net outcome of the Civil War
was "Jim Crow," and Plessy Vs. Ferguson, 1896. In short, very
nearly nil. A case can be made that the effects of the Civil War
were dwarfed by the effects of 1) the invention of the cotton
gin, and 2) the invention of the mechanical cotton harvester. As
against that, there is a fair case that Lincoln did
systematically set out to over-ride democratic institutions to
get the results he wanted.
A curious sidenote: if one compares these two key inventions in
the South to the development of the English textile industry,
the strange thing is that the cotton harvester came so far
behind the cotton gin. In Lancashire, inventions of that kind
tended to come at twenty-year intervals, not hundred-year
intervals. The question is, why did not mechanical cotton
harvesting not take off, circa 1830. The economics of slave
labor per se do not seem to be an adequate explanation. For one
thing, the economics of "Jim Crow" were very nearly the same in
the 1920's, when the first successful machine was introduced.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Oscar Chamberlain (19/21/2004 5:02 PM) commented, in reply
to me, that victory in the civil war at least prevented slavery
from being extended into the west, and even into Mexico. I
responded (10/22/2004 11:02 AM) that:
I doubt that slavery could have extended to the west very well.
By 1860, all the more hydrological portions of the West were
already settled. Not all of them had achieved statehood as free
states, but the essential pattern of their politics was in
place. What was left was mostly high plains and sagebrush, then
occupied by the Dakota, Crow, Arapaho, Cheyenne, Comanche,
Apache, and Navajo nations. It was a different ecology. If you
look at Andy Adams, _Log of a Cowboy_, the cowboy circa
1880 had a remuda of ten horses. He could ride a horse to
exhaustion in an hour or so, in the course of herding a couple
of hundred head of cattle, and then swap to another one, and so
on over the workday. That many cattle might need
something on the order of ten square miles of range.
Sheepherders, who were inferior in status to cowboys, were still
more solitary by profession. Nevada has a Basque-American
population descended from sheepherders who were imported
because Anglo-Americans could not or would not stand the
solitude. If a slave sheepherder had decided to go to Mexico, he
would probably not even have been missed for a
couple of weeks.
Even within the South, a case has been made (Ira Berlin) that
slavery was imploding into the Deep South anyway. Slavery was
being boxed down to a handful of labor intensive crops,
cotton and tobacco.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
In response to a suggestion by Chamberlain (10/22/2004 8:56 PM)
that slavery could have been extended to western mining, because
slavery had been used in ancient mines, I responded (10/23/2004
8:28 AM):
Yes and no. The ancient tradition preceded explosives and
stopeing.(*) Dynamite produces a kind of miner who is
also a grenadier when the situation calls for it. An example would
be the Bolivian miners in the revolution of 1952. The point about
tobacco and cotton was that, for a time, they resisted simply
having energy thrown at them. Mines yielded to dynamite. Grain
yielded to the McCormick reaper. In England, they were doing
steam plowing by 1870 or so, using a stationary steam engine with
a cable winch to pull equipment across fields, and of course steam
power was mandatory for "tiling," ie. installing drains under
fields to control waterlogging.
----------------------------------------------------------
Re the Bolivian miners:
June C. Nash, We Eat the Mines and the Mines Eat Us
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0231080514/002-5869904-9054436?v=glance
Amazon comment pages about books are notoriously unreliable,
but this one seems to be substantially accurate, as near as I can
remember from having read the boo twenty years ago.
----------------------------------------------------------
(*) the verb "stope" (not to be confused with stop) has a special
meaning in mining technology. It means to pull down or blow down
the roof. In metal mines, the veins, being volcanic magma
channels, are predominantly vertical. So the idea is to cut in
underneath, and let gravity help in removing the ore.
Stopeing can be done with a pick, but it is best done with
explosives, starting with gunpowder and progressing to
dynamite.
---------------------------------------------------
http://www.durham-miner.org.uk/miner/projects.nsf/0/acd11c7fa817916b80256e82004a471a?OpenDocument
[link broken and irretrievable, even with the wayback machine]
------------------------------------------------------
A USGS Textbook on mining
ANATOMY OF A MINE FROM PROSPECT TO PRODUCTION, United States
Department of Agriculture Forest Service Intermountain Research
Station, General Technical Report INT-GTR-35, Revised February
1995
https://www.fs.usda.gov/geology/includes/minerals/anatomy_mine.pdf
I once read in an Australian mining engineering textbook a
description of something called "automatic stopeing," which
the above textbook apparently does not cover. This involves
digging out multiple underground rooms, one above the other,
and placing explosives from them, in such a way as
to blow down the entirety of a vein in one blast.
--------------------------------------------------
An old novel, contains a reference (at the start of ch. 16)
to what may be pre-explosive stopeing.
R.M. Ballantyne, "Deep Down, a Tale of the Cornish Mines," 1868
https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/21726/pg21726-images.html
https://web.archive.org/web/20041120082649/http://hnn.us/comments/44802.html
To this, I responded (20/21/2004, 11:03 AM):